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Abstract
The border gateway protocol (BGP) controls inter-domain routing in the Internet. BGP is vulnerable
to many attacks, since routers rely on hearsay information from neighbors. Secure BGP (S-BGP) uses
DSA to provide route authentication and mitigate many of these risks. However, many performance
and deployment issues prevent S-BGP’s real-world deployment. Previous work has explored improving
S-BGP processing latencies, but space problems, such as increased message size and memory cost,
remain the major obstacles. In this paper, we combine two efficient cryptographic techniques—signature
amortization and aggregate signatures—to design new aggregated path authentication schemes. We
propose six constructions for aggregated path authentication that substantially improve efficiency of S-
BGP’s path authentication on both speed and space criteria. Our performance evaluation shows that
the new schemes achieve such an efficiency that they may overcome the space obstacles and provide a
real-world practical solution for BGP security.
1 Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [49, 57] is a distributed routing protocol that establishes how Internet
traffic is routed between autonomous systems (ASes). The stability of the Internet relies on the correct and
efficient functioning of the BGP protocol. Despite its central role in the Internet, BGP lacks security [53, 54].
The root of the problem is that BGP relies on hearsay information to update routing tables. Malicious routers
can insert false information into the messages they send, which will be used by other routers and further be
propagated when honest routers send extensions of these forged messages. A successful compromise of a
router may cause a variety of serious security problems quickly through out the Internet [42].
The current dominant security proposal, Secure BGP (S-BGP) [27], was proposed to address two major
BGP vulnerabilities—lack of authenticity of the information conveyed in messages and lack of authoriza-
tion for BGP routers to represent certain ASes. S-BGP ensures route authentication—it enforces only the
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authorized route propagation by each AS in the path; each route announcement from a peer was sent by the
indicated peer, the path was properly extended, and was not modified en route from the peer.
When it comes to deployment, S-BGP has faced two main obstacles: time and space. Performing the
signing and verification the protocol requires can significantly slow down the time it takes for route changes
to propagate throughout the network. To make S-BGP perform fast, routers require large amounts of RAM
to store the necessary public key certificates and digital signatures [29]—indeed, storing the digital signa-
tures on stored route announcements has been cited as being the main obstacle to S-BGP deployment [24].
Previously, we proposed a Signature Amortization (S-A) scheme [43] that can significantly speed up S-BGP
route authentication, but at the cost of even higher memory cost. In subsequent work, we considered using
aggregate signatures, which reduced memory but greatly increased authentication time—more than original
S-BGP [62].
In this paper, we propose new aggregated path authentication schemes for authenticating path infor-
mation in BGP route announcements. The main idea is to combine the time-efficient scheme of signature
amortization with the space-efficient techniques of aggregate signatures [4]. The aggregate signature tech-
niques effectively reduce the number of stored signatures necessary for path authentication. Furthermore,
we show that they are capable of producing very short signatures and utilizing hardware acceleration to
speed up signature verification.
We propose six constructions of aggregated path authentication to take advantage of options provided
by S-A and aggregate signature techniques. We then evaluate their performance using network simulation.
Mainly, compared with aggressively optimized S-BGP, the aggregated path authentication schemes achieve
significant performance enhancements:
• Software-only implementations can reduce convergence time by 32% over S-BGP.
• With hardware acceleration, we can reduce processing latency by 68%. The resulting speed is very
close to the speed of plain BGP without any cryptographic overhead.
• We can shorten the message size by 66% on average. . Furthermore, the amount of signature data per
message stays roughly constant with the path length.
• We can reduce the signature memory requirement by more than 72%, even when routers try to cache
all information. This suggests an overall memory savings of 60 − 70%.
Given the huge improvements on space and improvement on timing—and, if we admit hardware, the es-
sential elimination of a timing cost—aggregated path authentication schemes remove major obstacles to
deploying S-BGP. We are one step closer to practical and efficient BGP security.
This Paper Section 2 reviews BGP and S-BGP path authentication. Section 3 reviews related work on
improving BGP security performance. Section 4 presents our new aggregated path authentication schemes.
Section 5 presents performance evaluation methodology and experiment results. Section 6 further discusses
real-world deployment issues, and Section 7 concludes this study.
2 BGP and S-BGP
BGP The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the routing protocol for maintaining connectivity between
autonomous systems (ASes) in the Internet. Each AS is assigned a unique integer as its identifier, known
as its AS number. An AS manages subnetworks expressed as IP prefixes—ranges of IP addresses. A BGP
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speaker—a router executing BGP protocol—maintains connections (or called BGP sessions) with neighbor-
ing speakers, known as its peers, and sends an Update to announce a new preferred route to prefix p. The
route is a (prefix, AS path) tuple. The AS path is a sequence of AS numbers that specifies a sequence
of autonomous systems through which one can traverse the network; the last AS in this sequence is the
originator of this route. For instance, if the autonomous system ASk owns IP prefix p, the autonomous
system AS0 might send out an Update (p, {AS0,AS1, . . .ASk}) to announce the route that AS0 prefers to use
for reaching p. BGP speakers keep routes in the Routing Information Bases (RIBs): one Adj-RIBs-In per
peer keeps received routes from the peer; one Adj-RIBs-Out per peer stores all sent routes to that peer; and
Loc-RIB records all preferred routes for each prefix. Depends on implementation, Adj-RIBs and Loc-RIB
can either be separated or centralized physically. In this study, we consider the Adj-RIBs-In and Loc-RIB
together as the routing table for the BGP speaker.
Typically, a speaker’s Loc-RIB changes when it adds a new route, deletes a preferred route, or replaces a
previously preferred route with a new one. BGP speakers incrementally send Update messages to announce
such changes to their peers. When speakers establish (or re-establish) a BGP session, they share their own
Loc-RIBs with each other via a large number of Update messages announcing all preferred routes.If it
results in new preferred routes, processing of an Update message may create a number of new Updates.
If the speaker chooses to announce a new preferred route, it extends the existing AS path by perpending
its AS number to it and sends it to all of its peers, except the one who sent the route earlier. When a
speaker announces a route to prefix p, it implicitly withdraws the last route it announced to p. The recipient,
understanding this implicit route withdrawal, decides whether it prefers the new route. A withdrawal can
also be an explicit announcement, with no mention of an alternative preferred route. In this case, the recipient
may examine the previously received routes from Adj-RIBs-Ins to the same prefix and decide whether there
is an alternative to announce to its peers. If no such route found at hand, it simply withdraws the route as
well.
BGP rate-limits the sending of Update messages with parameter called the Minimum Route Advertise-
ment Interval (MRAI), which is basically the minimum amount of time that must elapse between successive
batches of Updates sent to a neighbor. BGP speakers have output buffers to keep waiting Update messages,
and send them in batches when reaching the MRAI. A speaker may have a different MRAI for each of its
peers or may have one MRAI that controls all peers. In practice, throughout the Internet, the default value
of the MRAI is 30 seconds.
Any change of network reachability will be reflected in the Loc-RIB of some BGP speaker. BGP will
then propagate this change via Update messages through the entire network, like a wave. The convergence
time measures the length of time for such wave of announcements to die out completely—in other words,
for the network to return to a stable state. During the transient period of convergence, the continual changing
of preferred routes degrades the effectiveness of packet forwarding. Longer convergence times thus reflect
increased network instability and may cause severe network performance problems. Studies of BGP have
considered convergence [18, 32, 52] and possible optimizations to control and accelerate it [21, 31, 33, 35,
46, 56].
S-BGP It has been widely recognized that the lack of security in BGP is a critical problem to the Inter-
net [27, 42]. BGP is vulnerable to malicious actors as well as to accidental errors. Because BGP speakers
completely rely on and believe in the routing information sent from peers, authentication mechanisms are
needed to provide route announcement authenticity. Origin authentication considers whether the originat-
ing AS really controls the claimed IP address ranges. Path authentication confirms that all the ASes are
authorized to announce the routes to the destination IP address block(s). In other words, the entire AS path
is authenticated only when the all participating ASes are confirmed to propagate the AS paths honestly and
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to attach correct extensions to the AS paths correctly.
The dominant security proposal, Secure BGP (S-BGP) [27] uses attestations to authenticate route an-
nouncements. Address Attestations (AAs) are for origin authentication, and Route Attestations (RAs) are
for path authentication. To support signing and verification operations, S-BGP also sets up public key in-
frastructures to establish the authenticity of the involved parties. ASes, organizations, and speakers have
their own X.509 [23] public key certificates, expressing the binding between the public key and the identity.
There are also address allocation certificate expressing authorized IP address ownership by organizations.
Next, we review more details of the S-BGP design. Since the focus of this paper is on path authentica-
tion, we skip the details on S-BGP PKIs and address attestations. More details can be found in [27, 28]. For
performance comparison, we assume all path authentication schemes discussed in this paper apply the same




S 1 = {1, p, 2}K1
p, {2, 1}
S 1
S 2 = {2, 1, p, 3}K2
p, {3, 2, 1}
S 1
S 2
S 3 = {3, 2, 1, p, 4}K3
Figure 1: The process of sending route announcements and their route attestations. We have four ASes numbered as
1, 2, 3, and 4. AS 1 initiates the process by sending announcement (p, {1}) stating that it owns prefix p and it is
reachable. It generates the corresponding route attestation by signing {1, p, 2} using its private key K1. It puts its
AS path first, then the prefix, then the intended recipient. The other ASes continue this process by signing the latest
AS paths, the prefix, and the intended recipient. The figure shows the AS path components in bold.
For path authentication, a route attestation (RA) is signed by a BGP speaker to authenticate the existence
and position of an AS number in an AS path [27]. Such attestation is nested: each BGP speaker signs the
AS path in sequence, as it joins. That is, first the origin BGP speaker signs the AS number of the origin
autonomous system and the intended receiver (in the form of AS number). The next signer is the recipient
of this RA; it computes and signs the concatenation of the new AS path, the prefix, and intended recipient.
The process goes on until the entire AS path is signed. The inclusion of the intended recipient and the prefix
in each signature is necessary to prevent against “cut-and-paste” attacks. Figure 1 demonstrates the process
of sending route announcements and their route attestations using an example.
Performance Issues Several factors affect the performance of path authentication in S-BGP, given the
structural properties of RAs.
First, BGP speakers consume extra CPU cycles when signing and verifying RAs and when handling and
validating certificates. Each preferred route announcement involves one signing operation by each signer
and k verification operations by each verifier (where k is the number of RAs for this AS path). Second, RAs
increase message size. Each message with an AS path of length k carries k nested RAs. Finally, to decrease
the number of signing/verification operations, one could cache the signed or/and verified routes in memory.
For both these reasons, memory cost becomes another important performance issue. Moreover, speakers
should also remember public keys, thus corresponding public key certificates, to validate RAs.
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Researchers have introduced a number of optimizations for S-BGP [26], mainly focusing on caching
signed and verified routes and applying DSA pre-computation. These optimizations reduce the computa-
tional cost related to cryptographic operations, in exchange for extra memory cost and computation com-
plexity.
Performance problems of S-BGP path authentication prevent its realization on the Internet. The criti-
cisms are mainly focused on too much memory for holding signatures and certificates for Update processing,
and high processing overheads. This research solves both problems; as the result, we bring S-BGP one step
closer to real-world realization.
3 Related Work
Despite its strong security, S-BGP’s performance issues become major obstacles. The performance studies
in [26, 29] offer detailed discussions on deploying S-BGP in the real world. The authors collected a variety
of data sources to analyze S-BGP’s performance impacts on BGP processing, transmission bandwidth, and
routing table size. These studies concluded that the memory requirements of holding route information, the
necessary certificates, and related cryptographic data are a major hurdle. On the other hand, our previous
studies in [43, 62] examine the S-BGP performance using simulation. Due to public key cryptography, S-
BGP path authentication is expensive on operational latency and thus greatly increases BGP convergence
time. We then proposed the signature amortization (S-A) scheme for improving efficiency. However, the
substantial speed-up by S-A comes at the cost of significant lengthened messages and increased memory
consumption.
Other studies tried to improve efficiency by lowering the security requirements. psBGP [58] increases
practicality by combining the centralized model of authenticating AS numbers with a de-centralized model
of authenticating IP prefix ownership and AS paths. Subramanian et al. [55] proposed the Listen and Whisper
protocols to address the BGP security problem. The Listen protocol helps data forwarding by detecting
“incomplete” TCP connections; the Whisper protocol uncovers invalid route announcements by detecting
inconsistency among multiple Update messages originating from a common AS. The Listen and Whisper
approach dispenses with the requirement of PKI or a trusted centralized database, and aims for “significantly
improved security” rather than “perfect security”.
Besides public key cryptography, there are efforts on securing BGP using symmetric key algorithms [17,
25, 61]. These proposals are more efficient on the operational latency, but require more storage, loose time
synchronization, and/or complex key-pair pre-distribution. Other work has examined the origin authentica-
tion problem [1, 11, 12, 59].
4 Aggregated Path Authentication Schemes
In this study, our goal is to maintain the strong security that S-BGP provides, while also providing more
efficient path authentication schemes that ease practical deployment on the Internet. We want not only
to improve the processing latency but also to reduce the space burden on the routers and on the network.
We can achieve both goals by combining time-efficient technique, signature amortization (S-A) [43], and
space-efficient cryptographic scheme, aggregate signatures [4, 5, 34].
In the first step, we use signature amortization techniques to reduce the latency by cryptographic oper-
ations, thus speeding up BGP convergence. Next, we use aggregate signature algorithms to reduce Update
message size and signature memory requirements on BGP speakers. We examine the concept of aggregated
path authentication—an aggregated signature for authenticating the entire AS path. The idea has been men-
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tioned in conversation as a potential application by the designers of aggregate signature schemes [4, 5]. In
previous work, we applied sequential aggregate signatures to S-BGP [62], but space consumption only got
worse. We now take a more thorough look.
In the rest of this section, we first briefly introduce the signature amortization technique and the aggre-
gate signature algorithms. Then, we discuss the details of our new efficient aggregated path authentication
schemes.
4.1 Signature Amortization
Signature amortization (S-A) was first proposed in our previous study [43]. The design is specifically for
speeding up the process on S-BGP RAs. S-BGP uses DSA as signature algorithm, mainly because DSA
produces short signatures. However, DSA signature verification is relatively slow. Realizing that majority
of cryptographic operations involved are signature verifications, we used RSA, which has fast verification
but slow signings. We then compensated for the slow RSA signings by amortization, in two steps.
In step one, when a BGP speaker sends the same route announcement to multiple recipients, it collapses
it to literally the same announcement—using a bit vector (or a more space-efficient equivalent) to express
which of the speaker’s peers are the recipients. Thus, the speaker only needs to generate one signature,
instead of one for each recipient; the verifier of this RA uses the bit vector to check the intended receiver.
To do this, the speaker needs to pre-establish an ordered list of its neighbors, and distribute this to potential
verifiers; S-A achieves the goal by putting this information in the speaker’s X.509 certificate.
BGP speakers keep outgoing Update messages in output buffers and, using MRAI timers, send them in
bulk. Thus, in step two, when an MRAI timer fires and a BGP speaker sends the messages accumulated in its
output buffers, it collects all “unsigned” messages, builds a Merkle hash tree [36, 37] on them, and signs the
root of the tree—thus generating one signature for all unsigned messages, instead of one for each message.
A leaf of the tree is the hash of the pair of a route and the recipient bit vector. The resulting RA consists
of the RSA signature on the root, the the hash path from the root to that leaf, the route, and the recipient
bit vector. A verifier of the RA can use these hash values and information in the route announcement to
construct the root of the tree correctly. There are trade-offs, however. The verifier needs to perform a few
extra hashing operations when verifying a RA, and the message size grows (due to the hash path).
Our studies [43, 62] have shown that S-A is very efficient in terms of speed. However, it substantially
increases message size and memory consumption. This is because RSA signatures are much longer than
DSA signatures (128 bytes vs. 40 bytes, for the RSA modulus length currently regarded as secure), and S-A
needs additional hash values for each signature verification (20 bytes each, assuming SHA-1 is still secure).
It is suggested that an S-A variant can use only the bit vectors to amortize the signing cost. This variant can
decrease space cost, since no hash paths are involved. Moreover, because bit vectors are much more stable
than the Merkle hash trees, it provides the opportunity to cache the signed and verified routes. Experiments
in [62] have shown that this variant reduces the message size, but increases the convergence time compared
with original S-A design.
4.2 Aggregate Signatures
An aggregate signature is a digital signature that supports aggregation: given n signatures on n distinct
messages from n distinct users, it is possible to aggregate all these signatures into a single short signature.
This single signature (and the n original messages) will convince the verifier that the n users did indeed sign
the n original messages.
There are mainly two proposals of constructing aggregate signatures [4], general aggregate signature
schemes and sequential aggregate signature schemes.
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General Aggregate Signature
The first approach is based on a co-GDH signature scheme, which can be based on any gap group. The
short signature scheme by Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham (BLS) [7] is such a co-GDH signature scheme that
makes use of elliptic curves. It is referred to as a “general” aggregate signature, since the aggregation
algorithm is public—given n signatures σ 1, . . . , σn, anyone can use a public aggregation algorithm to take
all n signatures and calculate the aggregate signature σ. The aggregation algorithm uses a bilinear map
between two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p, G1 and G2. Given an additional group GT ,
such that |G1| = |G2| = |GT |, a bilinear map is a map e : G1 ×G2 → GT with the following properties:
• Bilinear: for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
• Non-degenerate: e(g1, g2) , 1, where g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2.
We briefly summarize the Sign, Verify, Aggregate, and Aggregate Verify algorithm as the following.
Sign For a particular user, the algorithm works a normal co-GDH signature scheme. Given the private key
x and a message M, compute h← h(M), where h ∈ G2, and σ← hx. σ ∈ G2 is the signature.
Verify Given a user’s public key v, the message M, and the signature σ, compute h ← h(M); accept if
e(g1, σ) = e(v, h) holds.
Aggregate For a set of users U, where |U | = k, signatures {σi ∈ G2 | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} on messages {Mi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k},
compute σ←
∏k
i=1 σi. The aggregate signature is σ ∈ G2.
Aggregate Verify Given the aggregate signature σ, the message set {Mi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} on which it’s based,
and public keys vi ∈ G1 for all users ui ∈ U, verify the aggregate signature σ in two steps:
1. ensure that the messages Mi are all distinct, otherwise reject; and
2. compute hi ← h(Mi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and accept if e(g1, σ) =
∏k
i=1 e(vi, hi) holds.
Like a co-GDH signature, a bilinear aggregate signature is a single element of G2. Note that the ag-
gregation can be performed incrementally. This way, the aggregation is as fast as a modular multiplication.
The calculation involved in verify and aggregate verify algorithms is mostly the mapping e, which can be
implemented using pairing calculations. We discuss more details on how to compute pairing efficiently later
in Section 5.1.3.
Sequential Aggregate Signatures
A sequential aggregate signature scheme [34] is based on homomorphic trapdoor permutations, such as
RSA. Each signer incrementally signs the new message and incorporates it into the aggregate signature σ.
A party with knowledge of n messages, public keys of the n ordered signers, and σ is able to verify that
each signer si has correctly signed his message Mi and σ is a valid sequential aggregate signature. The
designers also showed how to instantiate the construction with the RSA trapdoor permutation. Briefly, we
review the resulting RSA aggregate signature scheme for n users with moduli of length l in the following.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l−1 be a hash function. Note that the following version requires that the moduli
must be ordered. However, the moduli can be unrestricted with a few additional steps in the algorithm.
Key generation Each user i generates an RSA public key (Ni, ei) and private key (Ni, di).
Aggregate Sign AggrSign(σ′,Mi)
As the base case, let i = 1, and the initial aggregate signature σ′ ← 0 on an empty message set. For
the ith signer, given a valid aggregate signature σ′ on {M1, . . . ,Mi−1} and public keys, she computes hi ←
H((M1, . . . ,Mi), ((N1, e1), . . . , (Ni, ei))), y← hi + σ′, and outputs σ← ydi mod Ni.
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Aggregate Verify Given aggregate signature σ on {M1, . . . ,Mi}, and public keys, the verifier does the fol-
lowing checks:
1. public keys satisfy requirements;
2. check that 0 ≤ σ ≤ Ni;
3. if gcd(σ,Ni) = 1, let y← σei mod Ni, else let y← σ;
4. compute hi ← H((M1, . . . ,Mi), ((N1, e1), . . . , (Ni, ei))) and σ′ ← (y − hi) mod Ni;
5. verify σ′ recursively;
6. accept if σ = 0 holds when i = 0, reject otherwise.
Running time The details of aggregate sign algorithm is the same as the ordinary RSA signing algorithm
plus a few additional big number calculations, whose running times are negligible compared with ordinary
RSA computations. Hence, we estimate the running time of aggregate sign as the same as the ordinary RSA
signing. The recursive aggregate verify algorithm works through layers of the aggregation until the base
case. Thus the running time can be estimated as the time of i RSA verifications plus a bit time on extra
calculation.
4.3 Aggregated Path Authentication
Now, we describe the aggregated path authentication schemes that apply S-A together with aggregate signa-
ture schemes. Again, S-A is a good candidate to speed up processing Updates, while aggregate signatures
can shorten the message size and release the memory burden. The number of signatures in a route announce-
ment is no longer linear in the length of the AS path. One aggregate signature is enough to the authenticity
of the entire AS path.
Using S-A, we have two choices. Recall that S-A amortizes signing cost in two steps. We may choose
to use bit vectors only (referred to as S-A-vector) or to apply bit vectors with Merkle hash trees together
(referred to as S-A-tree). Although S-A-vector may not result in high degree of signing amortization, it
allows us to apply two additional optimizations. First, since speakers no longer enclose hash paths in
Update messages to help signature verification, we can certainly further reduce the storage consumption.
Second, S-A-vector provides much more stable signatures for routes. In other words, with high probability,
when the same route announcement has been signed twice and sent to the same set of recipients, it will
have the same signature. This property allow the speakers to cache verified signatures to avoid duplicated
cryptographic operations. In contrast, such straightforward caching optimization for the S-A-tree is useless.
If the speaker uses the S-A-tree scheme, it is unlikely that the same route announcement will end up with
the same signature since the tree construction depends on the outgoing routes in the output buffers. Such
information is highly dynamic.
As discussed in Section 4.2, we also have two choices on aggregate signature schemes. General aggre-
gate signatures are based on short signature scheme (BLS). For standard security parameters, the signature
length is about half that of a DSA signature with a similar level of security. Sequential aggregate signa-
tures are implemented using RSA trapdoor permutation, thus the signature length is the same that of a RSA
signature with the same level of security. Certainly, general aggregate signatures outperform in terms of
space. However, the aggregate verify operation provided by the sequential aggregate signature scheme may
be substantially faster than the one provided by general aggregate signature scheme. Since the majority
of cryptographic operations performed by BGP speakers are verifications, sequential aggregate signature
scheme can be potentially the winner in terms of the speed.
To achieve the most efficient aggregate path authentication scheme, we design four constructions by
combining choices we have for S-A and aggregate signatures. We then use network simulation to evaluate
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their performance and to identify the most efficient scheme.
First, we define several notations. Let (pa, p) be the current route announcement, where p is the an-
nounced prefix and pa is the associated AS path to be sent. Let v be the bit vector indicating the recipients
of the route. Let σ′ be the aggregate signature on the previous route announcement and σ be th newly
generated aggregate signature on the updated route announcement. Let a ◦ b stand for concatenating a with
b. We now consider our four constructions.
GAS-V BGP speakers organize outgoing route announcements using a bit vector v, generate BLS signa-
tures on s ← sign(pa ◦ p ◦ v), and compute the aggregate signature σ ← σ′ · s. The outgoing route
announcement contains the route, the bit vector, and the aggregate signature, {(pa, p, v), σ}. For caching,
speakers can cache the route (pa, p, v) and associated aggregate signature σ to avoid duplicated signing or
verification. Furthermore, we can use either software or hardware implementation of pairing calculation for
verify and aggregate verify operation, we denote these two variants as GAS-V(SW) and GAS-V(HW).
GAS-T BGP speakers organize outgoing route announcements using a bit vectors, construct a hash tree
(the resulting root of the tree is R), generate BLS signatures s ← sign(R), and compute the aggregate
signature σ ← σ′ · s. The outgoing route announcement contains the route, the bit vector, the hash path
in the tree, and the aggregate signature, {(pa, p, v), hash path, σ}. BGP speakers do not cache any signed
or verified routes, their aggregate signatures, or hash paths. Similar to GAS-V, there are two variants for
GAS-T—GAS-T(SW) and GAS-T(HW).
SAS-V BGP speakers organize outgoing route announcements using a bit vector v, and generate aggregate
signature σ ← AggrSign(σ′, pa ◦ p ◦ v). The outgoing route announcement contains the route, the bit
vector, and the aggregate signature, {(pa, p, v), σ}. For caching, speakers can cache the route (pa, p, v) and
associated aggregate signature σ to avoid duplicated signing or verification.
SAS-T BGP speakers organize outgoing the route announcements using bit vectors, construct a hash tree
(the resulting root of the tree is R), and generate aggregate signature σ ← AggrSign(σ′,R). The outgoing
route announcement contains the route, the bit vector, the hash path in the tree, and the aggregate signa-
ture, {(pa, p, v), hash path, σ}. BGP speakers do not cache any signed or verified routes, their aggregate
signatures, or hash paths.
5 Performance Evaluation
Next, we discuss how we set up the simulation experiments for performance evaluation and present ex-
periment results that compare performance of aggregated path authentication schemes with S-BGP route
attestations. We focus on simulation experiments in this section. Section 6 will extend our discussion on
real-world deployment issues.
5.1 Evaluation Methodology
Given the distributed nature of BGP and the scale of the network system, we turn to simulation for perfor-
mance evaluation. Section 5.1.1 describes the metrics we use for performance comparison. Section 5.1.2
discusses the tools we use to carry out experiments. Section 5.1.3 presents issues of getting appropriate
benchmarks of running times for various cryptographic primitives.
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5.1.1 Performance Metrics
We use a set of metrics to evaluate performance in terms of time and space.
For time, we measure the number of cryptographic operations involved, the resulting CPU cycles, and
the BGP convergence time: the time it takes the system to re-achieve a stable state after a perturbation, such
as a new route announcement, a route withdrawal, or a router reboot. Particularly in our experiments, we
measure rebooting convergence time—the time between when a crashed BGP speaker returns to life and all
the changes that induces through the network. For each security scheme, we compare its convergence time
with convergence time that original BGP achieves for the same perturbation. (Given the distributed nature
of BGP, convergence time is very difficult to predict using analytical techniques.)
For space, we measure both the message size and the storage cost in memory. For simulation, we assume
a simple form of Update messages. In other words, we measure the bytes for basic Update message fields
and bytes for additional signatures, bit vectors, and hash values. Note that current MTU limitation on Update
message is 4096 bytes. In experiments, we relax this limitation. The experiments report both average and
maximum message sizes for us to understand the efficacy of different options.
To understand memory cost, we measure signature memory requirements. That is, experiments output
memory space for route announcements, signatures and bit vectors. For fair comparison, we assume BGP
speakers spend same amount of memory for storing certificates and AAs. Our further discussion in Section 6
covers more issues related to storing certificates and AAs.
5.1.2 Simulation
We use discrete-event simulation to understand the performance of path authentication schemes in a large-
scale environment. Similar to other studies [43, 62, 63], our experiments use SSFNet [9, 44], a discrete-
event simulator that provides a comprehensive model of basic BGP operations [47]. We take advantage of
the added hooks for variants of processing models of BGP security schemes [43].
Throughout this study, we evaluate security schemes in the same network topology and same BGP ac-
tivity setting. We use a 110-AS topology, with one operating BGP speaker per AS. For modeling simplicity,
each BGP speaker announces two prefixes. In our model, each AS also possesses virtual BGP speakers that
don’t actually run a simulated BGP protocol. We use the number of such BGP speakers to represent the size
of an AS; its size affects the time it takes for one Update message to be propagated through an AS.
We use the public data provided by RouteViews project [50] to generate a graph of AS connectivity
of the Internet, then reduce the size to 110 ASes using a collapsing procedure. This reduced graph still
preserves certain macroscopic properties [13] seen on the entire Internet. Moreover, we incorporate our
estimation of route filtering policies into the topology using a method, similar to the one proposed in [16].
During normal BGP activities, we let one BGP speaker crash and come back to life. We evaluate the
performance of the entire system during router rebooting process. The workload on BGP speakers could be
much higher than normal BGP activities. When re-establishing BGP sessions with its peers, the rebooting
BGP speaker receives routing table dumps in a short period of time from each its peers, via a large amount
of route announcements. To maximize the effects, we let the rebooting BGP speaker to be the one with the
most peers.
5.1.3 Benchmarks
It’s straightforward to decide the unit length of data structures involved in path authentication. For similar
level of security, S-BGP uses DSA algorithm with SHA-1, which results in 40-byte signatures and 20-byte
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Algorithms Running Time (ms)
Miller’s Algorithm on F397 24.0
BKLS on F397 23.6
Refined Duursam-Lee on F397 [20] 16.8
Modified Duursam-Lee on F397 [3] 8.6
Hardware implementation [30] 1.3
Table 1: Running times of Tate pairing calculation. Running times by software implementations are normalized
to 1 GHz processor. The hardware implementation assumes a conservative 10 MHz clock frequency on the target
technology.
1024-bit RSA 1024-bit DSA 1024-bit SAS GAS based on F397
Sign (ms) 50.0 25.5 50.0 11.0
Verification (ms) 2.5 31.0 2.5 43.0 × 2
SW Aggregate Verification (ms) – – 2.5 × k 43.0 × (k + 1)
HW Aggregate Verification (ms) – – – 1.3 × (k + 1)
Aggregate Sign (ms) – – 50.0 11.0
Signature length (bytes) 128 40 128 20
Table 2: Benchmarks of signature algorithms with same level of security. Running times are normalized to 200 MHz
CPU, a typical type of processors by edge BGP routers on the Internet, except hardware implementation of aggregate
verification. We assume that aggregate verification handles k distinct messages. Signature length by general aggregate
signature is based on BLS on F397 . For the same level of security, BLS renders 157-bit signatures.
hash values. A BLS short signature is 20 bytes long, and thus so is the aggregate signature by the general
aggregate signature scheme. An RSA signature is 128 bytes long, which is also the length of a sequential
aggregate signature. In building the hash trees, S-A uses SHA-1. Thus hash values are 20 bytes long.
We obtained the running times for standard signature algorithms, such as RSA and DSA, by benchmark-
ing the OpenSSL crypto library. However, OpenSSL does not have implementations of aggregate signatures.
Fortunately, we can decompose of calculation of each algorithm, obtain the running time of each steps, and
combine to estimate the total running time. We consulted the community and the literature from other crypto
libraries or implementations [2, 6, 40].
As mentioned above, the implementation of sequential aggregate signatures just requires minor modi-
fication of the RSA algorithm. Hence, we immediately estimate that signing and verification time by SAS
is the same as the RSA algorithm (running times by additional arithmetic operations are negligible); and
aggregate verification on k distinct messages costs about k times individual verification times.
To understand the running times by general aggregate signatures based on elliptic curves, we turn to the
literature of pairing-based cryptosystems. From [2], we learn that it costs about 2.2 ms to sign a message
using BLS. Aggregation on two BLS signatures needs another modular multiplication on 157-bit numbers,
whose running time is negligible compared with signing.
To estimate verification and aggregation verification performance, we need to understand pairing calcu-
lation. Pairing calculation in the verification and aggregate verification operations is relatively slow com-
pared with scalar point multiplication in signing operations. In the general aggregate signature scheme, one
verification is composed of two pairing calculations, and an aggregate verification on k distinct messages re-
quires k+ 1 pairing calculations. In recent years, an ever-increasing number of pairing-based cryptosystems
have appeared in the literature [48]. In turn, this has driven research into efficient algorithms for the imple-
mentation of bilinear pairing on elliptic curves. To date, the Tate pairing [14] has attracted attention as the
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most efficiently computable bilinear pairing on elliptic curves. In particular, Tate pairing over supersingular
elliptic curves achieves its maximum security in characteristic three. The classic algorithm for Tate pairing
computation on elliptic curves is Miller’s algorithm [38, 39]. Later, BKLS/GHS algorithms furthered this
development so that the Tate pairing became easier to compute in practice [2, 15]. Duursma and Lee [10]
further improved the Tate pairing calculation and extended to more general hyperelliptic curves. Yet even
more enhancements to Duursam-Lee Algorithm have appeared for supersingular elliptic curves over fields
of characteristic three [3, 20, 51].
Accompanied with huge improvements on software implementations of Tate pairing, there are a few
efforts on developing hardware to calculate pairings efficiently [19, 30, 45]. The main observation lies in
the fact that arithmetic architectures in the extension field GF(36l) are good candidates for parallelization,
leading to a similar calculation time in hardware as for operations over the base field GF(3m) [30]. Table 1
summarizes the running times of pairing calculations. We chose the running times by most efficient software
optimization and by hardware acceleration for our simulation experiments. Table 2 illustrates our estimation
of running time and signature length. We use these numbers as parameters in the simulation experiments.
5.2 Simulation Results
The security schemes have performance overhead over the plain BGP protocol. Mainly, we are interested in
comparing our aggregated path authentication schemes with S-BGP and S-A. Our simulation experiments
show that each construction of aggregated path authentication has its strength and weakness. GAS-V (HW)
clearly stands out to be the most efficient path authentication scheme. Like S-A, GAS-V (HW) achieves
fast BGP convergence, even slightly faster than S-A. At the same time, the resulting message size is about
34% of the message size in S-BGP. This keeps the Update message way below the MTU limit. In addition,
Update messages essentially do not grow as AS path length increases. This nice property is also reflected
in the signature memory consumption. GAS-V (HW) signatures cost only 28% of the memory for S-BGP
signatures. All together, we can confirm that GAS-V (HW) is a practical and efficient path authentication
for BGP that keeps the same level of security as S-BGP route attestations.
For software-only implementations, GAS-V (SW) has similar memory costs as GAS-V (HW), and still
has faster convergence than S-BGP.
Next, we present detailed experiment results by categories.
Processing Latencies and Convergence Time
We analyze the performance on speed by counting cryptographic operations first, then examining necessary
CPU cycles, and finally comparing convergence time during router rebooting.
In simulation, we model two versions of S-BGP. We use “S-BGP” to denote basic S-BGP, and “S-
BGP(CP)” for S-BGP with caching optimization and using DSA pre-computation to speed up the signing
process.
Figure 2 presents counting of verification and signing operations. All the schemes in this paper adopt
the same “lazy verify” optimization proposed by S-BGP [26], that is, BGP speakers verify signatures on the
route only when they decide to install the route into Loc-RIB. For verifications, caching optimization is quite
effective to reduce the number. As for reducing signing operations, all of the aggregated path authentication
constructions are effective. The number of signing operations for S-BGP and S-BGP(CP) are 22,072.3 and
11,521.9 respectively, which are too large to be shown in Figure 2. Most aggregated path authentication
constructions as well as S-A can reduce 98% of signings for S-BGP. Surprisingly, if using software pairing
calculation, GAS-T (SW) is the least efficient construction for amortizing signing cost. The main reason is
that GAS-T (SW) verification is much slower than that of hardware implementation and RSA verification.
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Figure 2: Counts for cryptographic operations. Note that aggregate verifications are counted too. For one aggregate
verification on k messages, we count it as k verifications. We also treat the pairing calculation the same way as for
normal signature verifications.
BGP speakers using GAS-T (SW) spend much longer time processing received routes. As the result, there
are not many outgoing messages waiting for MRAI timers at a time. The amortization degree by S-A is
more than 60, while GAS-T (SW) only achieves 28.2.
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Figure 3: Running time overheads and resulting convergence time.
Figure 3 shows the total CPU time spent for cryptographic operations and the resulting convergence
time. The CPU time for the different aggregated path authentication schemes varies greatly. GAS-V (HW)
is the most efficient scheme of our new schemes, while GAS-T (SW) is the worst. The latency is mostly
affected by number of operations and unit running times.
Clearly shown in Figure 3, all our aggregated path authentication schemes converge faster than S-BGP.
All, except general aggregate signatures using software pairing calculation, converges much faster than S-
BGP with both optimizations. The performance by GAS (HW) is even better than S-A, and is only 5 seconds
slower than plain BGP without any path authentication mechanism.
Recall that we measure the convergence time during router rebooting process. We can conclude that
aggregated path authentication schemes can achieve minimum impact on BGP convergence even when
routers are under pressure.
Message Size and Signature Memory Cost
Our experiment results presented in Figure 4 further conclude that GAS-V (HW) is not only the fastest on
convergence time, but is also the most economic on space. Note that GAS-V (or GAS-T) with either software
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or hardware pairing calculation present the similar performance on space. Hence, we simply illustrate
experiment results for hardware pairing calculation in Figure 4. Among all aggregated path authentication
constructions, GAS-V produces shortest Update messages. Using GAS-V, we have successfully shorten S-
BGP messages by 66%. GAS-V can also save about 72% of the signature memory requirements by S-BGP.
As mentioned above, the aggregated path authentication schemes are all capable of fast convergence. For
the resulting message size, however, tree-based schemes generate longer Update messages, because of extra
hash values carried in the messages. Moreover, GAS-based schemes outperform SAS-based schemes on
message size, because of much shorter aggregate signatures (20 bytes vs. 128 bytes). Vector-based schemes
(GAS-V and SAS-V) have another nice feature—maximum message size is close to the average size. This
feature gives us confidence that vector-based schemes will have no difficulty complying the Update message
















































Figure 4: Performance on space.
We also compare the signature memory overheads by caching schemes with the plain BGP. The numbers
shown in Figure 4 are the average memory overheads for caching signatures on one BGP speaker. This
include signatures for AAs as well as for RAs. For completeness of experiments, we include the memory
overheads on AAs for all of the path authentication schemes. GAS-V, again, achieves the best performance.
The resulting overhead is only about 28% the amount spent by S-BGP. Note that the current criticism on
S-BGP practicality is mainly on extra memory burdens. Our experiments indicate that GAS-V is not just
efficient—it can be a practical security solution for BGP path authentication.
6 Discussion
So far, our simulation experiments have confirmed that our design of aggregated path authentication is ca-
pable of saving storage space significantly for S-BGP route attestations, and they have minimum processing
overhead impact on BGP convergence even when the BGP speakers are under stress. These results suggest
that our aggregated path authentication can be a good candidate for practical deployment in the real world.
In doing so, several issues deserve more careful discussion and consideration.
6.1 The Real World
Limited by the scale of the simulation, we are not able to model the entire Internet to study the performance
impacts. Using the publicly available BGP data, we could get a sense on what it looks like if an aggregated
path authentication scheme is deployed in the Internet and how much it can improve based on S-BGP.
To make our discussion complete, we use the BGP routing table dump from Route-Views to understand
the memory cost on a real router. This table dump is collected from AS6447 archive on May 04, 2005,
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which takes 209MB in MRT[41] format. It contains 162,237 unique IP prefixes and 2,011,005 unique (AS
path, prefix) tuples. To cache all received S-BGP route attestations, the router should record 8,284,042
DSA signatures, which requires about 316MB in cache. Moreover, if the router also caches signed address
attestations, it should consume another 76.8MB at least. In total, we are looking at 393MB memory cost,
adding more than 180% to the BGP routing table size. In fact, we underestimate the amount by looking
at signature length only. As discussed in [29], the average size would be larger since other information is
involved in each attestation. We specifically chose to examine signature length only, so that we could have
appropriate comparison with aggregated path authentication schemes.
Now, let us calculate the space requirement for GAS-V scheme, the most efficient scheme shown in the
simulation. We assume that the bit vectors take 4 bytes on average. Since there are 2,011,005 unique (AS
path, prefix) tuples, GAS-V will take 108MB memory to cache all received and sent aggregate signatures
and bit vectors in memory. This number is substantially smaller than the one for S-BGP. The actual memory
cost for signatures only is reduced to less than 29%, increasing the routing table size by only 52%. We
believe GAS-V is much more manageable and feasible for real-world deployment.
To deploy S-BGP, we must consider the memory overheads for all necessary data structures, one of
them is storage for certificates. In simulation, we just assume every path authentication scheme uses the
same amount of memory for certificates as the common base for comparison. Now, we pay closer attention
to this amount. As discussed in [29], the scale of the Internet in 2003 required 75–85MB memory on a BGP
speaker to store all necessary public key certificates. Taking this amount into account, we conclude that the
overall savings by GAS-V against all memory overheads by S-BGP is 60%.
Kent et al. proposed to let ISPs extract only necessary information from certificates and AAs, and push
the data to their routers [26]. Routers do not need to store signatures for certificates and AAs. Such opti-
mization may save 50%–60% of the corresponding memory. We adjust the above calculation accordingly.
The resulting overall memory saving is estimated as 70.5% Moreover, if we consider the extracted informa-
tion from certificates, the space impact of different signature algorithms comes from their key sizes. Shown
in Table 6.2, the 1024-bit DSA with 160-bit exponent requires about 408 bytes to store the public key and
domain parameters. This number is higher than the key size for BLS or RSA, which suggests that we can
expect the overall memory saving to be slightly higher than 70.5%.
Noted in [29], for S-BGP in 2003, the Adj-RIBs space required for RAs is about 30–35MB per peer, and
the total requirement for a speaker with tens of peers may be gigabytes. However, current deployed BGP
speakers cannot be configured with more than 128M or 256M of RAM. With aggregated path authentication,
we still call for additional RAM on routers, unfortunately. The overall 70.5% memory savings certainly
reduce the gap between the memory demands and the reality1.
6.2 Switching to ECDSA
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is emerging as an attractive public-key cryptosystem. Compared to tra-
ditional cryptosystems like RSA, ECC offers equivalent security with smaller key sizes, faster computations,
lower power consumption, as well as memory and bandwidth savings. ECC has been endorsed by the US
government as the next generation cryptography. Aggregate signature techniques discussed in this study are
examples of using more efficient techniques to achieve the equivalent security.
ECDSA [60] is the elliptic curve counterpart of the traditional DSA algorithm. It has attracted a lot of
attentions recently. Popular cryptographic libraries have ECDSA implementation supported. Some hard-
1We do not exclude the possibility of adding more memory on routers. If one cannot add memory to a router because the vendor
provided no additional slots for more DIMMs, then any scheme that exceeds the memory limitations of deployed routers will be





(1024-bit) (1024-bit) secp192r1 sect163k1 sect163r2
Key Size (bytes) 135 100 408 180 139 155
Sign (ms) 7.8 2.2 3.5 1.0 3.1 3.1
Verify (ms) 0.4 8.6 4.5 4.4 8.2 8.7
Table 3: Key size and running times of signature algorithms with equivalent security. The benchmark numbers are
obtained from OpenSSL 0.9.8 beta version with ECDSA support on a 1GHz processor. Elliptic curves for ECDSA are
recommended by NIST for federal government use [60]. Key size accounts for public key and domain parameters.
ware architecture, such as Sizzle [22], even allow efficient SSL handshake on small devices using ECDSA.
S-BGP can easily switch to use ECDSA as the digital signature algorithm. We use the latest ECDSA imple-
mentation in OpenSSL 0.9.8 beta version to understand its performance. While, ECDSA is certainly much
more efficient than RSA computations, it is unclear if it outperforms DSA, except on the key size crite-
rion. Table 6.2 demonstrates the performance data of different signature algorithms with equivalent security.
Compared to DSA, ECDSA signing may perform faster. Recall that majority of cryptographic operations
for S-BGP RAs are verifications, we expect no significant improvement on processing latencies. Moreover,
both DSA and ECDSA using 160-bit curves produce 40-byte signatures. Certainly, more developments on
speeding up ECDSA in the future may lead us to re-examine this issue.
6.3 Hardware Acceleration
Another interesting issue brought up by aggregated path authentication schemes is the hardware acceler-
ation for pairing calculation. Recent rapid developments in improving pairing calculation are driven by
applicability to many new EC-based cryptosystems and protocols. To give a few examples, pairing-based
systems can support identity-based encryption systems, efficient key agreement protocols, credentials and
secret handshakes, provable secure signatures, short signatures, group signatures, blind signatures, proxy
signatures, multi-signatures, threshold signatures, intrusion-resilient encryption systems, etc. Many studies
have designed and prototyped significantly improved efficient software/hardware implementations of pair-
ing calculation that make these cryptosystems practical. For instance, in 2001 when short signature was first
invented, the authors report 2.9 seconds for verification [6]. Then in 2004, the reported running time for
BLS verification was reduced to 45.2 ms [2]. Now, hardware parallelization allows the pairing calculation
to be accomplished within 1.8 ms [30]. Our experiments confirm that such hardware implementation allow
us to achieve efficient BGP security on both speed and space.
In addition, the aggregate verification algorithm in the general aggregate signature scheme provides us
even more opportunities for potential hardware parallelization. As discussed in Section 4.2, the core cal-
culation for aggregate verification is to test whether the following equation holds: e(g1, σ) =
∏k
i=1 e(vi, hi).
The pairing calculations on the right hand side are all independent. For a typical small value of k, it should
be possible to design a hardware implementation that further parallelizes the calculations. In fact, k is fairly
small in the real world. Current BGP CIDR report shows that AS paths are of length 3.7 on average and 11
maximum [8].
Moreover, we envision wide deployment of such hardware accelerator for cryptographic calculations
not only for its efficiency, but also for its practicality and usability in the real world. (If student wants to do
a doctoral thesis here, please apply to the authors.)
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7 Conclusion
The secure BGP proposal has been around for some time. It provides comprehensive security counter-
measures to authenticate routing information propagated by BGP speakers. However, route attestations by
S-BGP are expensive in terms of processing overhead and space consumption.
We combine the efforts by signature amortization and aggregate signature scheme and design new ag-
gregated path authentication schemes. Choosing various options for each technique, we try out six different
constructions for aggregated path authentication—GAS-V(SW), GAS-T(SW), GAS-V(HW), GAS-T(HW),
SAS-V, and SAS-T.
We use simulation to evaluation performance of each construction and compare them with S-BGP and
S-A. Experiment results show that GAS-V using hardware implementation of pairing calculation delivers
best performance. It has minimum impact on BGP convergence and can substantially reduce 66% of the
message length and 60 − 70% memory cost by S-BGP.
Our work is the first published report applying aggregate signatures to BGP path authentication and
analyzing the practicability and performance issues. Our further analysis on real-world deployment and
hardware acceleration convince that GAS-V is an efficient and practical solution for BGP security.
The simulation methodology we apply in this study has limitations. There are several issues left out.So
far, we use simulated network traffic in the experiments. One may suggest use real BGP traffic to drive
simulation. This method may produce more realistic analysis results on message size and memory cost. On
the other hand, we need a single event to measure convergence time. It is difficult to separate an event from
such continuous Update traffic. In the future, we will consider the possibility to use emulation approach to
combine the simulated network with realistic BGP traffic.
When a BGP speaker has high degree of connectivity, there exists a trade-off when explicit inclusion of
AS numbers as recipients yields a smaller RA than the bit vector. In the simulated 110-AS topology, the bit
vector approach is always better than AS number approach, since BGP speakers only have a few peers. We
will consider larger simulation model in future to learn such trade-offs.
Moreover, we are going to explore the issues on storage space for certificate distribution and practical
hardware cryptographic accelerators.
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